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Yes.  Why will take longer since the bureaucracies are very defensive about this topic. 
 
Introduction:  Special Challenges 
 
Every intelligence professional knows that the domain they enter presents unusual challenges.  
Stakes can be extremely high (like life or death for nations, or for your personal infantry squad).  
Information is always incomplete and all too often incorrect.  Moral ambiguities abound, and 
tradeoffs between alternative outcomes can be excruciatingly painful.  Least evil options are 
sometimes the only options available better than watching catastrophe unfold. 
 
To be considered a professional by polite society one must belong to a group mature enough to 
have developed codes of ethics, among many other issues of standards, training, expected skills, 
duties and such.  It took doctors and attorneys centuries to develop their codes, and issues still 
remain or emerge anew with new technologies.  So this is not an easy process even for normal 
organizations (1, 2) which intelligence bureaucracies are not.  
 
We do not have centuries to linger on nuances now, because nuclear, biological and other 
‘special’ weapons could destroy our civilization.  So a sense of urgency is appropriate.   
Intelligence failures sometimes precede catastrophic wars.  Politicians and their policy people 
often blame intelligence staff for their own policy failures (see “Elephants in the Room” to 
follow).  But after the carnage is done, finding who to blame is a sad exercise among tragic 
people most of whom were sworn to protect the innocents of their countries. 
 
Bureaucracies are not people.  They are composed of people, like a human body is made of cells. 
But bureaucracies have emergent properties, system dynamics, capabilities and behaviors that go 
far beyond what any individual human or cell could accomplish.  Bureaucracies have no souls or 
conscience in the human sense, but they fear ethics and oversight.  This is why they often crucify 
whistleblowers.  Fear is seldom the stated reason, but it is often the real reason.   
 
Some secrets should be exposed, lest they lead to waste, fraud, abuse or the murder of thousands 
of innocents.  But the mantra of protecting sources and methods generally prevails, even when 
the real reason for secrecy is bureaucratic incompetence, sloth or mortal sin.  Finally, be assured 
that you can put good people into a dysfunctional system, and that bad system can then put the 
good people to work on very evil ends.  Totalitarian governments provide numerous examples 
from history.  Most of them are gone now; a warning to those who think the status quo is stable. 
  
So bringing ethics to intelligence bureaucracies is not easy, but is important.  I am not a moralist, 
rather a practical person trying to preserve civilizations faced with profound challenges in the 
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third millennium of the Common Era.  So I beg you to attend, and to do better than I have as you 
move forward.  The order of presentation will be: 1) a brief history of the quest for ethics for 
spies, 2) a quick survey of a dozen U.S. intelligence agencies, 3) discussion of ‘Elephants in the 
Room’ that are seldom mentioned where everyone has been scrubbed by security clearances, and 
4) conclusions about why systemic, bureaucratic fear of ethics is a primary cause of other 
problems that bedevil those guardians who would like to be called professionals of intelligence. 
 
A Very Brief History of Intelligence Ethics from Sun Tzu to Jan Goldman and Beyond 
 
Sun Tzu did not write directly for spies, although his 13th chapter is all about them (3).  Sun Tzu 
wrote scripture for Generals, where he said that the first of five fundamental factors in war is 
moral influence, and fourth is command.  By command he meant the General’s qualities of 
wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage and strictness.  So, moral issues were very important to 
Sun Tzu, who encouraged his high level readers to be extremely forgiving of spies, since the 
information spies obtained could be decisive in battle or even in the life or death of nations. 
 
Millennia of experience since have shown that spies are often expected to violate or ignore many 
laws of ordinary men.  Bribery, extortion, propaganda, torture, assassination and threats of 
assassination have been tools of tradecraft since the beginning of recorded history.  Sometimes 
these bring victory, in the short term anyway, which is as far as many politicians think.  But the 
recurring brutal consequences of no ethics at all, also led to development of things like the 
Catholic Just War Theory, international laws of war like the Geneva Conventions and domestic 
variations like the U.S. Laws of War (4) and Uniform Code of Military Conduct.  
 
Libraries are filled with writings from attorneys and practitioners trying to pin down every detail 
of what is proper conduct when.  Yet deeper thinkers like Russell Swenson find that ethics begin 
where laws end, and nearly everyone with deep experience knows it is impossible to codify all 
the bizarre scenarios that actual intelligence professionals may encounter (5). 
 
Jan Goldman from what was then called the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) and Jean 
Maria Arrigo from Southern California engaged a few others with serious interests in ethics for 
intelligence professionals including especially the uniformed services of the United States in an 
attempt to transcend these dilemmas.  Dr. Arrigo had compiled histories of intelligence personnel 
with an emphasis on ethical dilemmas they encountered during their careers.  Goldman had been 
teaching ethics, so he and Arrigo began with some panels in 2005 at a Joint Services Conference 
on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE) and engaged a committee of like minded scholar practitioners.  
In 2006 they hosted a two-day conference to lay groundwork for what would eventually become 
an “International Intelligence Ethics Association” (IIEA).  Goldman’s first book on “Ethics of 
Spying” was published in 2006 (6) and he later got a Ph.D. in this esoteric subject. 
 
Parallel efforts were occurring in other places, like European efforts to address this problem, led 
partly by Hans Born of the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in 
Switzerland (7) and Mark Phythian and Ian Leigh in the UK.  The fall of the Berlin Wall greatly 
accelerated this process.  In Latin America, many countries struggled with how to democratize 
intelligence entities that had been devoted to persecuting political dissidents until their military 
governments were replaced by more democratic ones.  The “dirty wars” of the 70’s and 80’s had 
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many echoes, one of which was reform of intelligence institutions (8).  Virendra Verma in India 
helped organize an association of retired Pakistani and Indian intelligence officers to work on 
both ethical issues and on practical issues of crisis communications to avoid future wars.    
 
Most involved in these disparate efforts recognized that challenges varied considerably such that 
no one code could possibly do for all job types. Collectors, analysts, operators and managers face 
very different problems, each with challenging moral dilemmas in the peculiar, high stakes world 
of intelligence systems.  And none, to be blunt, found much guidance from their institutions.     
 
Attracted by these efforts I hosted three panels with 18 papers on these topics at the 2007 
conference of the International Studies Association, and engaged 12 other authors who could not 
come to that conference, to create a competitive, judged process leading to a 50 page reader used 
by both the CIA and DIA for awhile (9).  But all of these efforts ran into considerable trepidation 
from people not retired, and resistance both subtle and blunt from institutions that had once hired 
many of the people cited here.  
 
Goldman’s conferences revealed a host of people who were sincerely and deeply interested in 
intelligence ethics, active duty, retired and academics alike.  But they also surfaced a recurring 
problem of active duty personnel being denied permission to attend because of fears by their 
agencies that they might reveal secrets to civilians.  Some could come, many could not.  The 
mirror image of this are conferences of cleared insiders from which the unwashed are excluded, 
like a recent symposium at the National Intelligence University (February, 2012, paraphrased by 
Bailey).  There is progress, but it sputters, and the security clearance barrier is a big reason why.   
 
This barrier is so important that I will address it separately at the end.  But in one very simplistic 
sentence, it separates the deeply moral from those willing to hide crimes against humanity if so 
ordered.  Then, the latter can chat about small issues, while ignoring elephants in the room that 
sometimes result in the murders of innocents all over the world.  
 
Another window on this dilemma is what typically happens to cleared insiders who try to reveal 
serious wrongdoing in their agencies.  Typically the effort is just a career negative unless they go 
public, in which case they get crucified except in police-states where they may be literally killed.  
To polite society, whistleblowers are heroes, but to insiders they are often considered traitors.  
They have violated a code of omerta that often preempts other guidance like the US Constitution.  
I will recall very briefly here the experience of some veterans of the NSA, CIA and FBI to 
illustrate their dilemmas.  
 
 Brian Snow and Thomas Drake at the NSA (U.S. National Security Agency) 
 
At one of those IIEA conferences I met Brian Snow, a 30+ year veteran of the NSA including 
many years as a senior intelligence executive.  In retirement, Snow put great effort into 
developing a draft code of ethics for collectors.  Collectors are among the more problematic 
categories of intelligence professionals, although none rival the covert operators for dilemmas.  
Like Goldman at the JMIC, Snow had assembled a group of collaborators including insiders with 
moral concerns and outsiders with expertise on either spies or dilemmas faced by human beings.  
For seven years he tried to get officials to pay attention.  Snow and his colleagues got many 
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encouraging nods, but scant progress on making serious ethics training part of agency education 
programs, much less establishing real codes of ethical conduct for intelligence professionals (10).   
 
It is not that agencies don’t have codes; some do.  Their codes are just remarkably rudimentary, 
or legalistic references to Byzantine documents that do nothing to cultivate an ethos that can be 
internalized.  “Don’t steal from the government” is required of every federal employee.  Prudent.  
“Avoid conflicts of interest, and don’t lie to your bosses.”  That’s nice too, but underwhelming, 
especially since the same employees may be required to lie to the rest of the world in their daily 
work, where deception, theft, manipulation and occasional betrayal or murder are part of the 
operating environment. “Don’t reveal secrets;” that’s pretty universal, and understandable, unless 
the secrets protected are killing your Constitution.  The only other universal I have found is 
seldom explicitly written, but certainly is recognized worldwide.  That is “Don’t get caught!”  
 
One of Snow’s younger colleagues, Thomas Drake, got into serious trouble trying to expose 
waste, fraud, abuse and unconstitutional behavior in the NSA.  In the search to find terrorists in 
post 9/11 America, NSA developed a software program for scanning domestic communications 
with relatively strong civil liberties protections to try to find real terrorists among the millions of 
ordinary citizens who sometimes rant about things they don’t like about the government.  Those 
citizens are thousands of times more common than actual terrorists in North America, which 
makes this a quest for intelligence efficiency as much as for preserving liberty.  The system they 
designed in house worked well and cost a few million dollars.   
 
Then Director General Michael Hayden opted for a fancy, defense industry plan that cost over a 
billion dollars, did not protect civil liberties, and ultimately did not work well at finding terrorists 
anywhere.  After spending over $1 billion they scrapped it.  When Drake tried to point out huge 
waste, fraud and abuse issues inherent through established channels, he was ignored as so many 
others are.  When he went public, carefully never sharing a classified datum, he was threatened 
with prosecution under the 1917 Espionage Act and confronted with a possible death penalty.   
 
That kind of bureaucratic overreaction to whistle blowing is all too common in the intelligence 
world.  Drake’s case was so egregiously unfair that it caught the attention of CBS’s 60 Minutes 
and other major media, so in the end the prosecutors reluctantly settled for a minimal plea 
bargain of misusing government computers (11).  
 
Free, but fired and exhausted from four years of fighting for his literal life for an alleged crime of 
revealing literal truth in the interests of the United States of America, Mr. Drake experienced the 
harsh reality that truly ethical people inside these secret societies are often punished severely if 
they actually act on ethical impulses.  Those who would teach ethics should attend, because 
without protection of those who would be ethical, you are just setting them up for career suicide. 
 
And that is just for calling attention to waste, fraud and abuse.  What about murders of innocent 
people?  Army Private Bradley Manning is confined today for exactly that, along with spilling 
hundreds of thousands of State Department cables where the underwear of international affairs 
were often discussed.  We will return to Private Manning in due time. 
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Valerie Plame Wilson at CIA, and predecessor operators like Burton Gerber and Melissa Mahle, 
and principled analysts from Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity like Ray McGovern 
 
The excellent 2010 movie “Fair Game” was inspired by a book written by CIA case officer 
Valerie Plame Wilson (12).  Her exemplary nuclear non-proliferation career had been destroyed 
by operatives from the White House, only one of whom was ever charged (“Scooter” Libby of 
VP Dick Cheney’s office).  Libby’s conviction was promptly commuted by President Bush, so 
insiders know he was taking the fall for crimes committed by people far more powerful than he. 
 
Valerie’s crime – well, she had not committed any and no one said she did.  Her husband Joe 
Wilson, a former Ambassador for the Department of State, had dared to write some truth in the 
New York Times about lies promoted by the White House to sell the invasion of Iraq.  Valerie 
Plame Wilson’s career was destroyed by exposing her identity (and the lives of all her contacts 
abroad were also endangered) to send a message to the rest of the US intelligence community on 
what could happen to anyone if even your family dared to defy party lines on discretionary wars.  
 
Mrs. Wilson was dragged into public truth-telling by her very public crucifixion.  Once her cover 
was blown in major papers, her career as a covert operator was over regardless of whether she 
might be excused for her husband’s truth telling about an issue of war and peace, and life or 
eventual death of thousands of American troops and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.  
 
The Wilson case was dramatic enough to make a movie about it, but it was preceded by many 
quieter cases of CIA insiders revealing some horror story such as those that led to the Church 
commission hearings in 1976 and such.  I met Burton Gerber and Melissa Mahle at another of 
those IIEA conferences.  Among other assignments, Gerber had been chief of the Moscow 
station back when the Cold War was often hot in proxy countries, and Mahle had a similar career 
among Mideastern nations.  Both were retired now, and had encountered ethical dilemmas that 
troubled them, but found very little guidance or help from the system to deal with them.  So both 
wrote books (13, 14) and appeared as speakers at those early intelligence ethics conferences. 
 
Ironically, Ms. Mahle could not actually give her speech that day, because the CIA’s office of 
publications review would not clear her comments.  This is another barrier to those who would 
be ethical inside, the forever prohibition on telling the truth about things that should be known 
unless one gets permission from a bureaucracy that fears truth a lot, and ethics even more. 
 
The importance of protecting “sources and methods” is universally recognized among 
intelligence professionals, including me.  But thought control runs very deep in spooky-luky 
land, and these are NOT the same concepts.  The non-disclosure agreement that all employees 
must sign is a Rubicon that keeps them forever apart from polite society unless they are prepared 
to risk incarceration or worse.  So, while mostly unknown, Burton Gerber and Melissa Mahle 
were pioneers by raising the possibility of public discussion of ethical dilemmas for spies. 
  
Analysts Ray McGovern and David MacMichael went further in a different way.  After 
retirement as CIA analysts they agitated for years about growing violations of Constitutional 
principles within our US intelligence community.  One was prior Army, the other a Marine 
officer before both joined the CIA, so they took their oaths to protect the Constitution more 
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seriously than some.  Quiet agitation produced no change, so they co-founded a group in 2003 
called “Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity” when the lies used to sell the invasion of 
Iraq to a gullible U.S. public became too egregious.  That has not produced much practical 
change either, but it does provide an outlet for other intelligence retirees alarmed by present 
trends of reckless immorality and indifference to Constitutional principles. 
 
 Coleen Rowley and Michael German at the FBI 
 
Coleen Rowley gained national prominence by testifying to Congress about failures to connect 
dots at the FBI prior to 9/11 and became a “Person of the Year” for Time Magazine in 2002.  
Like whistleblowers everywhere she got hammered by her bureaucracy, even though she only 
testified after weeks of getting no attention to her in-house communications.  A career special 
agent, she had also taught Constitutional Law to her colleagues for 13 years as the staff attorney 
for a regional FBI headquarters, so ignoring that pesky Constitution after 9/11 bothered her.   
 
Michael German had been an undercover agent for the FBI for 16 years, and complained about 
mishandling of a terrorism investigation.  That got him a polite good bye from the FBI, and 
awards from groups like the Los Angeles Federal Bar Association.  Then he wrote a revealing 
book comparing the “terrorist mind sets” of foreign jihadi’s and of domestic zealots from the 
skinhead, Aryan Nation and other neo-Nazi groups in America (15).  German now works as a 
civil liberties and national security specialist for the American Civil Liberties Union, still trying 
to protect the Constitution he swore to preserve as an FBI agent.   
 
There are others at the FBI, CIA, NSA and in every other agency who remember core principles, 
and who take the Constitution seriously.  But they seldom blow whistles and over half of all FBI 
agents are now assigned to chasing terrorists rather than bank robbers, fraud or Wall Street 
crimes.  That matters a lot.  Since there are very few real terrorists in America, domestic or 
otherwise, many agents are reduced to surveilling peace groups, labor, environmentalists and 
feminists much like in the bad old days of J. Edgar Hoover.  Also, low IQ people who rant on 
Facebook are now often seduced into crossing red lines by Special Agents posing as Al Qaeda 
operatives and giving them fake weapons in order to puff up counterterrorism metrics. 
 
Hoover thought that any critic of government (like Dr. Martin Luther King) was a potential 
subversive.  So his FBI conducted a five year psychological operations campaign against Rev. 
King that began the day after John F. Kennedy was killed, and ended only when MLK was 
assassinated.  That campaign included fabricating false documents and sowing discontent among 
factions of what would become one of the greatest achievements of American democracy, the 
civil rights movement.  All due to paranoia about people who criticized immoral governments. 
 
That is history.  What matters now is growth of a vast bureaucracy devoted to domestic 
surveillance, best described by Dana Priest of the Washington Post in a series called “Top Secret 
America” (16)  Top secret people say they are “protecting America” while many actually erode 
the Constitution that made us a leader among nations.  To be blunt, many of these bureaucrats 
are not interested in ethics because real ethics might restrain their true quest for ever more money 
and power. We spend billions today to stop events that are less common than deaths to bee stings 
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in North America.  The annual quest to justify those billions spent leads to millions of Americans 
who are now considered “potential terrorists” because of their politics, religion or ethnicity. 
 
A Host of Europeans and Latin Americans  
 
Hans Born, Mark Phythian, Ian Leigh and Russell Swenson were mentioned at the onset of this 
essay, because they wrote English language papers and books about democratic reforms of 
intelligence systems, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Berlin Wall, and military 
governments in Latin America.  Michael Herman, ex-of GCHQ in Britain also hosted an ethics 
conference there.  Thomas Bruneau and colleagues from the Center for Civil – Military Affairs at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (17) wrote about Brazil in particular and Latin America generally.   
Preceding each of these, were large numbers of scholars and practitioners in those areas and 
countries, working in their own languages to reform systems that had afflicted their populations 
rather than protecting them.  I want to acknowledge these people as a very worthy group I see 
only by reflection in literature by others.  Only a few can I mention explicitly, like Christiana 
Matei who has written extensively about reforms in her native Romania (18).  In Latin America, 
Marco Cepik and Joanisval Goncalves of Brazil have been noteworthy, and Eduardo Estevez in 
Argentina.  But those are just three countries among dozens of others that endured huge 
transitions from military/police-state type governments to more democratic forms.  And in each 
of those countries there were dozens or hundreds of people who were intimately involved with 
intelligence community reform, both certified “insiders” who stayed inside their classified 
cocoons, and outsiders with academic, human rights, legal or other credentials that helped the 
process along.  I simply want to acknowledge them en masse, in my ignorance of their 
particulars, and move back to the U.S. system that I can know slightly better. 
 
A Brief Survey of a Dozen U.S. Intelligence Agencies in early 2012 
 
Dr. Goldman provides much more detail on Agency “ethics” codes than I will here in his 
Appendix A (pp. 379 – 393) on “Principles, Creeds, Codes and Values” (6).  He had to work like 
a dog to get those, even though employed by the Joint Military Intelligence College, security 
cleared, and working on an ethics Ph.D.  Jan still had to pull teeth from chicken’s lips, because 
the bureaucracies are truly afraid of ethics.  Many US agencies would not respond to his requests 
for text on ethics no matter what assurances he gave.  Knowing this background, I decided to do 
a simple survey in 2012 to see if things had moved forward during the last decade.  Maybe, but 
the bureaucracies were more reticent with me and I was less persistent than Goldman. 
 
So I called and/or emailed when calling was not encouraged the following components of our US 
intelligence community on or very near January 19, 2012:  ODNI, CIA, NSA, FBI, DHS, NGIA, 
NRO, DEA, Department of State’s INR, Treasury, Energy, and the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA).  I spared the uniformed services on the theory that DIA and ODNI would do for them.  
To each, after a call I sent a standard email request for any information they could provide, with 
three specific questions.  1) Does your agency have a code of ethics specific to it?  2)  If so, may 
I get a copy?  3)  And if so, how does your agency try to teach ethics to its employees?  As 
expected, I got little concrete response to this query, but what they sent was instructive anyway. 
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The most substantive response came from a public affairs officer in the usually extra secretive 
NRO (National Reconnaissance Office).  He did this because a) he was a human being with a 
conscience, and b) in conversation with his partner in the office (who suggested blowing me off) 
he offered that they did not want people thinking that the NRO was “afraid of ethics.”  A 
prescient person that one, and a better public affairs officer than most.   
 
One contrast would be the NSA whose unnamed public affairs officer sent me these exact words: 
“Good Afternoon, Thank you for your email and your interest in the National Security Agency.  
Due to the current ops tempo, we are unable to assist you at this time.  Please visit our web site, 
www.nsa.gov, for information regarding the Agency.  Have a great day.”  Of course ops tempos 
are high everywhere; we thoroughly understand that.  But this is also a perennial excuse to avoid 
ethical issues in many bureaucracies.  They are just too busy to be bothered with ethical issues. 
 
The most common response was no response.  Of course I could pester them for months, and 
assure them I don’t bite, and eventually get a few more scraps of things we mostly already know.  
Every US federal employee must read and sign off on a common code for stewardship of 
financial resources (a.k.a. don’t steal).  Each is instructed to avoid conflicts of interest in various 
ways, and to obey “the law.”  Intelligence Community personnel are also required to know about 
Executive Orders # 12333, # 12958, and the ODNI’s additional ethical guidance if any.  The 
ODNI sent me some on March 22, 2012, affirming why the National Counterterrorism Center 
can now keep records on all Americans for five years, regardless of any connections to terrorism.  
Defense Department agencies are also bound by Directive #5500.07 (Standards of Conduct, Joint 
Ethics Resolution of Nov. 29, 2007) http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/550007p.pdf  
and DoD Directive # 5240.01 http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/524001p.pdf  of 
August 27, 2007.  Each of these is chock full of legalistic language that could not inspire even 
attorneys.  Each uniformed agency also has its own list of “core values” which are invariably 
quite honorable qualities, like to work with “integrity” or to strive for “excellence” or to put duty 
to country before personal welfare.  But such admirable virtues are also too general to serve as 
codes for the excruciating situations that intelligence professionals may encounter in their work.  
What I sought was a code, or codes of ethics like attorneys and physicians have, concise enough 
to be inspirational (and read, unlike the million+ items in U.S. “law” today) but precise enough 
to appeal to the real dilemmas faced by real intelligence professionals in the field or otherwise. 
 
Readers may interpret this tiny exercise however they like.  I think it supports the thesis that 
American intelligence bureaucracies (at least) are actually afraid of ethics, are very reluctant to 
discuss it with anyone “uncleared,” and really do not like oversight no matter how often they 
claim to embrace that concept.  Oversight is difficult enough when it is done by committees of 
Congress that are forbidden to talk publicly about whatever they are told by agencies “overseen.”  
Actual oversight is anathema to most intelligence agencies, and who should be surprised? 
 
Elephants in the Room 
 
This nervousness is obvious before any discussion of the elephants in the room of intelligence 
affairs in America today that are so clearly visible to those outside the security cleared cocoon.   
I will list just three, and comment very briefly before turning to the practical issue of why the 
bureaucracies are so frightened by such things.  They are, 1) initiation of illegal and immoral 
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wars, 2) torture as official policy (resulting in more murders) and 3) violations of the U.S. 
Constitution that all American intelligence professionals are sworn to protect and defend. 
 
1. The invasion of Iraq was sold by flagrantly fraudulent intelligence claims, many of which 
are known with 100% certainty today to have been false (19).  That makes our invasion 
of a country that did not attack us, did not have WMDs, and was adversarial to Al Qaeda 
rather than friendly, an international war crime.  This means we have murdered hundreds 
of thousands of innocent people and coincidentally caused the deaths of thousands of 
U.S. servicemen and women, and serious injuries to tens of thousands more.  Who wants 
to deal with the ethical implications of this elephant in the room?  Almost no one because 
it causes us such pain.  And therefore many otherwise exemplary people follow the party 
script, read the abundant propaganda, deny reality, and pretend there is nothing wrong 
with murdering thousands of innocents and committing war crimes against humanity.(20) 
 
2. Along this difficult path, powerful parties in America decided that torture was OK for us 
(if others do it, torture is still condemned) despite our domestic laws forbidding torture 
and signed international treaties that forbid torture under any circumstances whatsoever, a 
very rare stringency in international law.  Along with systemic torture came kidnappings 
of foreign nationals in many countries, including a few who were 100% innocent victims 
of confused identification and such, some of whom were literally tortured to death. (21) 
 
3. Along with those atrocities came systemic violation of the U.S. Constitution to rationalize 
surveilling every U.S. citizen in various novel ways like the warrantless wiretapping of 
domestic communications described by the Washington Post (15), by definition without 
probable cause since every single U.S. person could not possibly be a terrorist, and more 
intensive surveillance of others because they are Muslims or activists. We have murdered 
U.S. citizens overseas without due process of law as in the cases of Anwar Al Awlaki, on 
Sept. 30, 2011, his 16 year old son Abdul Rahman al Awlaki two weeks later on Oct. 14, 
and Samir Khan, an editor of the Al Qaeda publication “Insight.”  Many commentators 
on the left, right and middle of our domestic political spectrum have noted that this has 
damaged our Constitution a lot (Congressman Ron Paul and comedian Bill Maher are 
examples along with ABC News, and the Los Angeles & New York Times, (24, 25, 26)).   
 
Does initiating wars “of discretion” against innocent peoples bother intelligence bureaucracies in 
America?  Apparently not, since the agencies are mute about that.  Does torturing people and 
violating both domestic and international laws on that bother our bureaucracies?  The record 
there is mixed, because there were both public and private discussions of those dilemmas, many, 
and some reform of disgusting practices once revealed.  Does savaging our Constitution and 
murdering even American citizens abroad without due process of law bother our bureaucracies?  
Apparently not, according to Attorney General Eric Holder (27) or the CIA, Special Forces, and 
Air Force predator operators who do much of the actual killing without public comment, some of 
whom are personal students of mine. 
 
Even the U.S. Congress bowed and groveled by authorizing all of these evil and unconstitutional 
things in its latest Department of Defense Authorization Act of 2012.  That authorized a sitting 
President at war to not only kill anyone, anywhere, but also directed our Department of Defense 
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to be prepared to hold indefinitely U.S. citizens thought to be possible supporters of terrorism, 
without due process of law, forever (28).  So another bureaucracy of cowardly politicians (the 
U.S. Congress) is apparently shameless in its sin as well (29).  But few are surprised by that as 
public approval of Congress now approaches single digit levels in America today.  
 
Conclusions – Why?  
 
I have been very judgmental here, and the good book says “Judge not, lest ye be judged.”  In 
truth I am deeply sympathetic to the harsh dilemmas faced by intelligence professionals, and 
deeply grateful to those who have risked much to give birth to the beginnings of a professional 
ethos for those who work in the shadows of society, keeping chaos at bay.  It makes life so much 
harder for professionals when they work for institutions that are morally bankrupt, clinically 
paranoid, and that force methods on their employees that are damaging to all (a.k.a. tradecraft).  I 
am very, extremely sympathetic for the many excellent people who join such organizations with 
the best of intentions, and who suffer many bad consequences of this institutional toxicity while 
trying so hard to protect and serve the peoples of the countries that employ them. 
 
So let’s be clinical for a moment.  Intelligence bureaucracies fear ethics for at least five reasons:  
fear, greed, embarrassment, an obsession with secrecy itself, and resulting isolation from polite 
society.  We will consider each in their turn briefly. 
 
Fear: Tasked with defending America (in our case, parallels with others are obvious) from all 
threats to the Republic, and faced with novel dangers of international terrorism, our Intelligence 
Community (IC) has overreacted enormously. Pervasive propaganda to encourage public support 
for unpopular wars and invasive surveillance at home blows back on the agencies themselves. 
 
Greed:   A climate of perpetual fear leads to much bigger budgets for all of the security and 
intelligence services.  Yet it is a statistical fact that North Americans in North America are less 
likely to be killed by actual terrorists today than they are to be killed by bee stings, by our own 
toasters, by lightning strikes or by many other graphic examples of how grossly exaggerated the 
real threat of “terrorism” is.  But you will never hear that in a pitch to Congress about budgets. 
  
This has many extremely adverse and expensive consequences I will neglect for now except one.  
Many more American servicemen and women now die by their own hands each year than all 
Americans killed by terrorists in North America. More U.S. veterans commit suicide each year in 
America today (~18/day) than active duty troops die who are deployed in actual war zones.  This 
is a tragedy and a scandal directly related to the prime crime of waging immoral wars abroad. 
 
Embarrassment:   No bureaucracy (or human being) likes to admit mistakes, so some secrecy is 
common to bureaucracies in general.  So much more so in those where secrecy is quite essential 
to their function, and where stakes include life or death for someone every day.  Physicians bury 
their mistakes, but physicians seldom have to bury their own colleagues when someone finds out 
their true identity.  IC bureaucracies do not want their mistakes, waste, and other dirty laundry 
revealed to a world that is very focused on costs of government in normal times, much less when 
thousands are dying each year because of mistakes made long ago.  It bears emphasis that the 
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obsession with secrecy makes learning about those mistakes extra difficult, so mistakes have 
grown large and scary by the time many inside can begin to know the scale of sin involved.  
 
The Obsession with Secrecy: Anyone who has run agents knows why protecting sources and 
methods is critical.  Anyone who has walked on death ground understands why protecting 
operational plans is an issue of life and death for you and yours.  Anyone who understands 
special weapons comprehends why some things simply should not be disseminated openly.   
 
But trying to operationalize protection of essential secrets in large bureaucracies has led to a 
spider’s nest of rules, regulations and cherished customs that turns back to ensnare and poison 
the very people who created them.  The greatest political accomplishment of the United States of 
America has been our Constitution, which has been savaged by many people recently, most of 
whom sincerely thought they were doing good things.  There is no doubt that secrecy is essential 
for many aspects of actual spy agencies.  But you should remember Aristotle, who pointed out 
that any virtue, even the best virtue, can become a harmful vice if carried to unhealthy extremes. 
 
Security clearance systems isolate many good and kind intelligence professionals from deeply 
moral people (like their mothers and spouses) who can often see more easily what is wrong, and 
sometimes help with solutions.  Furthermore, the most moral people simply will not sign a broad 
non-disclosure agreement that requires keeping ALL secrets, no matter how lethal or evil.  That 
keeps those with moral dilemmas inside isolated from outsiders with expertise in such problems, 
like clergy and psychologists.  I mean no insult at all to the dedicated people who enter these 
dysfunctional systems trying to do good by protecting their societies from angry, armed 
adversaries.  I do intend to warn such professionals why these best intentions of sincere people 
are so often frustrated, and occasionally are turned to doing evil itself by dysfunctional systems.  
That has bad consequences for IC employees, as evidenced by their stunning rates of divorce, 
alcoholism, and suicide, among other indicators of excessive stress induced by employer rules.   
 
The cost of such dysfunctions to America has been profound.  It is profound for practitioners as 
well as for our nation.  Once we were a moral leader among nations.  Those days are long gone.  
We created the concept of human rights, and now we are a poster boy for violations of them.  
Practical consequences abound, like the growing reluctance to share intelligence and costs of 
combat to name just two.  Once we enjoyed substantial support from many other nations, not 
least in intelligence affairs.  That has been severely degraded by our reckless, immoral and 
illegal wars against countries that never attacked us.  And by attacking truth when it objects. 
 
Ethics matter.  And discarding ethics just because we are scaring ourselves to death, to get a few 
billions more in budgets, because we prefer to hide our embarrassments, and/or because we are 
obsessed with some aspects of tradecraft and thus are isolated, is insane.  But it is not inevitable. 
 
U.S. Army Private Bradley Manning will be prosecuted someday.  His alleged crime was 
revealing classified information, by giving data to Wikileaks.  The data included something he 
called “Apache Airstrike” which others labeled “Collateral Murder.”  This was gunship video 
showing an attack on a group of eleven men on July 12, 2007 in Baghdad, most of whom were 
unarmed and two of whom were war correspondents for Reuters.  They were killed, including 
the reporters.  Reuters is upset about that.  Manning is also charged with transferring hundreds of 
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thousands of State Department classified cables, which revealed all sorts of private reactions, 
assessments and deals with embassies worldwide.  This was extremely embarrassing to many 
people, but so far no one I know has shown that even one death has resulted therefrom. 
 
Private Manning will be an especially challenging case study of the core dilemma, because to 
polite society he is a hero for revealing to citizens of America what their government was truly 
doing in various places with our money and our children under arms.  To America’s IC Manning 
is a traitor of unusual proportions, because he told so much truth when truth was classified. 
 
Manning was arrested in May 2010, and charged with transferring classified data to unauthorized 
media on July 5, 2010.  He was kept in solitary confinement under maximum security conditions 
for almost a year, until Amnesty International and 295 legal scholars noted that the conditions he 
experienced at Marine Corps Brig Quantico amounted to violations of the U.S. Constitution.  So 
In April of 2011 he was transferred to medium security conditions at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  
Almost two years after his arrest Manning has still not been prosecuted, partly because they are 
struggling with how to hold a secret trial of someone who now has an international reputation.  
There is a fear that even more embarrassing secrets might be revealed in his defense. 
 
You will know that ethics has arrived in America’s Intelligence Community, when people who 
defend our Constitution by telling our citizens what they need to know about our government are 
labeled “patriots” instead of “traitors.”  Until that day, spies can pretend they are being “ethical” 
until the sun grows cold, and the only people to be fooled will be those in the cleared cocoons 
where political power determines which truths are “the” truths, and which shall be prosecuted. 
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